ABSTRACT:
IMAGINING THE LAW-TRAINED READER: THE FAULTY
DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIENCE IN LEGAL WRITING TEXTBOOKS.
In law schools today, first-year legal writing courses play a crucial role in
helping students learn to communicate about the law. Many legal writing
teachers approach legal writing education in a practical way, attempting to pass
on their own experiences in law practice settings to students. Unfortunately, as
other writers have observed, such reliance on personal knowledge about “what
lawyers are like” may lead legal writing teachers to oversimplify a complicated
matter – the needs and preferences of the audience for legal writing – and may
even amount to indoctrination in stereotypes about law practice.
This article offers a closer look than past critiques at the actual depiction of
the “law-trained reader” in some popular legal writing textbooks. These texts
deliver surprisingly consistent messages about “what lawyers are like,” namely,
extraordinarily impatient with other people (even in their thinking and reasoning
processes); aggressively critical; and conservative and formalistic in outlook.
Such over-generalizations about the audience for legal writing seem unlikely to
help students improve their legal writing. Worse yet, uncritical presentation of
these particular generalizations probably exacerbates student difficulties in
reconciling their personal and professional identities during the first year of law
school, and may impact female and minority students in a disproportionately
negative manner.
Legal writing education should stop inviting law students to imagine the
audience for their writing as extraordinarily impatient, aggressive critics, red
pens and format guides in hand. Instead, we should develop more careful and
reflective methods to assist students in negotiating between their personal and
professional voices and grappling with the complex audiences and purposes for
their legal writing.
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IMAGINING THE LAW-TRAINED READER:1 THE FAULTY DESCRIPTION OF THE
AUDIENCE IN LEGAL WRITING TEXTBOOKS.
Learning to write as a lawyer writes means, in a very real sense,
becoming a lawyer. When we teach people how to write, we are
teaching them not only word choice, organization, or even
composing habits; we are also inevitably leading them into the
strategies and conventions of a particular discourse and thus offering
them membership into that discourse community.2
Introduction
In law schools today, first-year legal writing courses play a crucial role in
preparing law students to communicate with the “law-trained reader.” Most legal
writing teachers approach the task in a practical way. We give our students
realistic legal problems to research and analyze. We discuss practical topics such
as the relative weight of different legal authorities, the typical structure of legal
arguments, and the writing style that (we believe) lawyers prefer. We pass on
what we gleaned from practice about the format of common legal documents and
the way lawyers analyze legal problems in writing. In short, we try to acquaint
students with the law practice settings we ourselves are familiar with, to
empower our students to succeed in similar settings.
Unfortunately, relying on our personal knowledge about “what lawyers are
like” as the basis for our teaching can lead us into over-generalizing and
oversimplifying a complicated matter – the needs and preferences of the audience
for legal writing. This article3 examines the depiction of the law-trained audience
1

Linda H. Edwards’ first-year legal writing textbook gives this label, “law-trained reader,” to the
members of the audience that law students are writing for. See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING AND ANALYSIS 69 (2003) (“[L]aw-trained readers share certain characteristics. Even in
large cities, lawyers and judges live in a legal community that shares certain values, customs and
forms expression.”)
2
J. Christopher Rideout and Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV.
35, 58 (1994).
3
I owe thanks to David R. Papke, Rebecca Blemberg, James R. Elkins, and Kathryn Stanchi, for
reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to the presenters and
attendees at the Art of Legal Writing Conference at American University in April 2005, for helpful
comments on early versions of this article. And I cannot thank enough my research assistants Elyse
Aasen, Caz McChrystal, and David Moore for their research and editing assistance.
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in some popular for first-year legal writing and research courses and finds that
they lean too heavily on such overgeneralizations. Specifically, these textbooks
offer surprisingly consistent messages about lawyers’ personalities, namely, that
most lawyers are extraordinarily impatient with other people (even in their
thinking and reasoning processes); aggressively critical; and conservative and
formalistic in outlook.4 Such generalizations are an inadequate and inaccurate
description of the real “law-trained readers” that students will encounter in
practice – individual human beings, working in complicated institutional and
social frameworks, and reading for different purposes at different times.5 The
“law-trained reader” is too diverse and complicated to be captured by such
generalizations about the purported shared traits of human beings who have
completed law school.
In this article, I argue that legal writing teachers should avoid relying on such
over-generalizations, for at least two reasons. First, engaging our students in
thinking and discussion about the nature of the audience for whom they are
learning to write is more likely to help them learn to write well than relying on
overgeneralizations about the audience.6 It is better pedagogy to help our
students grapple with the complex, varied audiences and purposes for which they
will write after law school than to suggest there is some “monolithic” audience of
those who have completed law school.7
4

See infra Part II.
See Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that “[law students and lawyers] are
situated in several social settings at once. They are working within the law office and law school
communities, whose members are making various and changing demands on the writer. They are
usually also working within the larger legal community, whose members have set ethical and
practice standards. And they come from different gender, race, and ethnic communities that may
generate different learning styles and perspectives.”
6
Similarly, composition teachers and scholars have in recent years questioned the common practice
of teaching “audience analysis” as a first step in the “prewriting” stage of the writing process. See
Mary Jo Reiff, Teaching Audience Post-Process: Recognizing the Complexity of Audiences in
Disciplinary Contexts, 13 WAC. J. 100, 100-01 (2002) (examining writing assignments across the
curriculum and across the disciplines, and suggesting that post-process thinking can improve
writing education “[b]y challenging the stable, monolithic audience of the classroom.”) Of course,
the analogy to teaching audience in general composition courses is not quite apt, since legal writing
teachers need to help students learn to write for a more particularized audience (and more particular
purposes) than general composition teachers. Still, the audience analysis issue in the generalcomposition context has some useful parallels with the issue of how to teach about audience in
legal writing courses.
7
C.f. Reiff, supra note 6, at 100-01.
5
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Second, the particular generalizations found in these textbooks could
undermine more than our own teaching – they could undermine law students’
abilities to bring their individual perspectives into the legal discourse community.
If delivered without question or criticism, teaching students such generalities
about the audience for legal writing (stereotypes, really) can become
indoctrination, implicitly advice that students must accept and emulate such
behavior to succeed in law school and in the law.8 Whatever one thinks about the
value of impatience, aggressive criticism, and formalism in law practice, such
traits are not necessary or even desirable in every area of law practice, and
depicting the law-trained audience in such broad strokes is a poor representation
of the diverse personalities and approaches that characterize law practice in the
United States.9 First-year law students are in the midst of a struggle to establish
8

Feminists, for instance, have argued that law teaching in general functions to guide “individual
assimilation into hostile, elite, and previously all-male organizations.” Lani Guinier ET AL.,
Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
6 (1994). In a similar vein, Kathryn Stanchi has discussed how the entire legal writing curriculum,
if taught uncritically, helps to achieve the “muting” of outsider voices in the law, at least in part
because of the focus on meeting the expectations of the audience of people who have already
become lawyers, see Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy
Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outside Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998), and how
legal writing teachers face the decision whether “to ease the students’ entry into the [legal]
community, [or] to challenge the customs or culture of the community,” id. at 22.
Related concerns animate many critiques of legal writing education. See, e.g., Teresa Godwin
Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 SW L.J. 1089 (1986); Brook K. Baker, Transcending Legacies
of Literacy and Transforming the Traditional Repertoire: Critical Discourse Strategies for
Practice, 23 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 491 (1997); Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature,
Limits, and Dangers, 49 MERCER L. REV. 709 (1998).; Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation
Processes and Resistance to In”doctrine”ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A
Commentary on Mertz’s Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000). Most recently, Andrea McCardle has reflected on the challenge for
clinics, lawyering courses, and legal writing courses to help students “aquir[e] a writing voice that
is appropriately professional, without losing a sense of individuality.” Andrea McCardle, Teaching
Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal
Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501, 502 (2006).
9
See, e.g., Guinier ET AL., supra note 8, at 84-86. Beyond that, such stereotypes not only blur the
diverse backgrounds and personalities of the human beings who make up the legal community, they
greatly oversimplify the motivations for lawyers’ and judges’ preferences and behaviors. Cognitive
and social science research shows how such “dispositional” explanations for human behavior,
though greatly appealing to many human beings, inadequately account for our actual preferences
and choices. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J. 1, 133-35 (2005). “Social science has clearly
demonstrated that we are not who we think we are. It is true that we experience ourselves thinking,
preferring, acting, and willing, [i.e., as dispositionist] but those comforting perceptions are often
illusory, and they obscure the far more significant influence of our unseen interior situation.” Id. at
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new identities as lawyers,10 and we should expect them to listen especially to the
messages we send about what lawyers are like, the ways that lawyers think,
speak, and behave.11 Instructing students about the existence (and implicitly the
value) of such generalized personality traits without question or criticism
legitimates the traits, even invites students to learn to think and act in the same
ways. Unquestioning presentation of such generalizations about the typical “lawtrained reader” might also impact different groups of students differently,
building the confidence of students who are already self-identified as impatient,
aggressive, and formalistic when they enter law school, and undercutting students
who are not, or who cannot or do not want to be.12

133. Thus, “[j]udges, being human, understand and portray their individual decisions as both
internally coherent and coherent across cases, doctrines, and time” because human beings have an
inherent tendency to prefer coherent explanations of their conduct (whether or not their conduct is
characterized by coherence). Id. at 135. Similarly, in the legal writing context, a judge’s level of
impatience with a lawyer’s writing in any given instance will relate to various factors such as the
particular purpose for which the document is written, the nature of the issues being discussed, what
else went on that day, any prior experiences between the particular writer and reader, etc., etc.
10
See Carrie Yang Costello, Changing Clothes: Gender Inequality and Professional Socialization,
N.W.S.A. J.., Summer 2004, at 138; see also James R. Elkins, What Kind of Story is Legal
Writing?, 20 LEGAL ST. F. 95 (1996) (discussing Scott Turow’s One L and noting that “Turow’s
narrative hints at how . . . . [t]he transformation of student into lawyers comes at the cost of a
valued sense of self – a Faustian bargain.”).
11
Legal writing courses are not the only courses in the law school in which the teachers present
such information about what lawyers are like. Such teaching surely occurs in other practice-like
courses, such as clinics, trial practice, and moot court, and probably in many traditional so-called
“doctrinal” courses. See McCardle, supra note 8, at 504 (noting that the challenge of helping
students “preserve some sense of individual voice and ownership of their writing . . . and negotiate
[the] formal structures and idioms” of the legal community is a shared “project for clinical,
lawyering, and legal writing teachers.”). But legal writing courses are, in most law schools, the
courses in which it is most likely that the teachers will directly instruct first-year students about the
shared characteristics of the law-trained audience, as they are the first courses in which students are
required to role-play the lawyer.
12
Thus, we might expect teaching students that law-trained readers are, on the whole, impatient,
aggressive, and formalistic, seems likely to have disproportionately negative impacts on some
students, particularly female students and students from other groups which in the past were
excluded from law practice and which remain underrepresented in it, as well as any individual who
will not (or cannot) identify with the purported shared characteristics of most lawyers.
In analyzing how the legal communication strategies taught in legal writing courses may work to
“mute” the voices of “outsiders” to the legal discourse, Stanchi has discussed the complicated
question of whether women and men tend to communicate differently: “the existence and cause of
differences in [female] register [that is, linguistic features such as qualifying phrases, softspokenness, etc.] between the powerful and powerless is a matter of intense debate,” and at least
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In short, I propose that instead of admonishing students that they must write
more clearly and concisely because lawyers share the traits of extraordinary
impatience, aggressive criticism, and knee-jerk-formalism, legal writing teachers
should engage students in specific, realistic, and critical thinking about the varied
and changing audience for legal writing13. The legal writing classroom should

three competing theories explaining the perception of such difference: one, the theory that “women
use less powerful and effective speech styles because they are socialized to do so, to keep them
from positions of power and to avoid offending men”; two, the theory that questions the judgment
that the purported women’s register is in fact less powerful or effective and instead questions “why
certain registers are more valued than others and encourages the valuation of ‘women’s language’”;
and three, the theory that “it is the identity and position in the social hierarchy of the speaker, not
the particular features of speech . . . that causes speech to be devalued . . . . [s]o [that], for example,
a woman who pauses before answering is unsure, a man who pauses is thoughtful.” Stanchi, supra
note 8, at 47-49. There is likely some truth in each of these theories, see id. at 50 (“[p]robably the
reality involves a combination, or even synthesis, of these theories”).
For discussion of why adopting the characteristics of the stereotype is not necessarily a solution to
the problem facing students who perceive themselves, or are perceived by others, not to fit the
stereotype, see id. at 51 (“Thus the outsider student’s dilemma of whether to change her voice is
complicated by the notion that it might make no difference – she still might not be ‘heard.’”); see
also Yang Costello, supra note 10. Yang Costello’s research suggest that dissonance between a
student’s pre-law-school and law-school identities, (that is, perceived dispositions), can have
negative personal and professional effects, see generally Yang Costello, impacts which remain
regardless of the extent to which disposition actually explains or affects one’s experiences.
13
Some composition scholars use the term “situatedness” to describe this concept, that “writing
must correspond to specific contexts that naturally vary.” See Lee-Ann M. Kastman Breuch, PostProcess “Pedagogy”: A Philosophical Exercise, in CROSS-TALK IN COMP THEORY 115 (VICTOR
VILLANUEVA, ED. 2003). Though scholars continue to debate whether any “post-process” pedagogy
can exist, in view of the “situatedness” and interpretive nature of writing (and perhaps the nature of
human communication in general), see id., the “social context” view of legal writing proposed by
Rideout and Ramsfield incorporates key concepts of the post-process scholarship into a helpful
vision of legal writing pedagogy:
The legal writer cannot write in a vacuum and is not free to pursue writing at
leisure. Rather, the situated legal writer must instead learn to write in a new
institutional setting, learn a new local practice, and react positively to new and
changing circumstances. The revised view suggests that she must build
techniques that allow her to respond effectively to the writing demands made of
her while at the same time reshaping her writing process. Taken together, these
adjustments to a new social and writing context challenge the new lawyer, who
is entering a complex world with high stakes. Writing in the practical context
requires well-developed techniques, sharpened tools, and cool heads. Law
school can offer time to discover and rehearse these techniques so that the new
generation of lawyers is well-equipped to communicate effectively within a
rapidly changing practice. Law schools should therefore change their
approaches to teaching writing so that novices practice research and writing
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provide students the opportunity to engage in critical, thoughtful discussion about
the characteristics of the human beings who make up the law-trained audience,
the purposes and characteristics of particular types of legal writing, and the
character that good lawyering, and justice, require.14
In the first section of the article, I present research regarding the image of the
law-trained reader in some popular first-year legal writing textbooks, showing
how these texts explicitly and implicitly instruct first-year law students regarding
an image of the law-trained reader as impatient, aggressive, and unduly
formalistic.15 In the next section, I argue that legal writing teachers should stop
relying on such generalizations about the “law-trained reader” in their teaching
first, because such generalizations are not an effective way to help students learn
to write for the “law-trained reader,” and second, because such generalizations
can devolve into indoctrination in traits that are not necessary and not beneficial
in many contexts, and that we therefore should not pressure all students to
emulate. Finally, in the concluding section, I suggest better methods for helping
first-year law students imagine the audience for their writing.

throughout law school, receive steady and expert feedback, and graduate
competent and comfortable to begin whatever legal career they choose.”
See, e.g., Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2, at 98.
14
See Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2, at 98.
15
See infra section I.
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The Image of Lawyers in Legal Writing Textbooks: Impatient,
Hyper-Critical Formalists

.Many popular first-year legal writing textbooks16 speak quite directly about
the personal characteristics of members of the law-trained audience. Three
purported lawyer characteristics in particular emerge from the descriptions of the
law-trained audience in these tests, namely that lawyers are (1) extraordinarily
busy and impatient; (2) hyper-critical, and aggressive in their criticism; and (3)
bent on a conservative, strict application of formal rules.17 In many texts, this
third characteristic, formalism, is bolstered by instruction that students should
carefully adhere to some version of the “IRAC” formula in ordering their
sentences and paragraphs throughout written legal analysis.18
A.

The first shared trait: extraordinary impatience.

The first characteristic, lawyers’ extraordinarily cramped schedules and
related impatience, is probably the most frequently mentioned characteristic of
lawyers in the first-year textbooks. Lawyers’ intellectual impatience is invoked
16

I turned to the legal writing textbooks commonly used in first-year legal writing courses for
evidence regarding the purported assumptions and preferences of the legal discourse community. I
focused especially on three popular texts with which I have become particularly familiar in my own
teaching: LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS (2003); RICHARD K. NEUMANN,
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE (5TH ED. 2005); and
HELENE S. SHAPO, MARILYN R. WALTER, & ELIZABETH FAJANS, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE
LAW (rev. 4th ed. 2003). None of the concerns expressed in this paper diminishes my great respect
for the authors of these texts. Each has been a pioneer in the legal writing field, and I focused
especially on these texts largely because I think each of them can be a strong tool for teaching legal
writing, and because each has influenced my own teaching.
My intention in this paper is to criticize legal writing education that presents students with an overgeneralized image of the law-trained reader, without encouraging students to reflect about that
image. I recognize and hope that many legal writing teachers, including the authors of the texts I
examine in this paper, already provide a balanced, nuanced image of the law-trained audience in
class or in other interactions with their students.
17
I cannot help but wonder if these characteristics are more accurate descriptions of the members
of the legal writing teachers’ community than of law-trained readers in general. I have had the
experience of inviting practitioners to speak to my legal writing classes to give a “real-world”
perspective and then standing by as some speakers offer a much more laid-back, dare I say sloppy,
approach to matters such as grammar, punctuation, and citation form than I take myself. And when
I imagine the stereotypical legal writing teacher, I imagine some harried, red-pen-toting, grammarloving soul like myself.
18
See infra, section I.C.
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as a reason why legal writing must be concise. For instance, in discussing
readers’ “attention levels,”19 Linda Edwards emphasizes that “these [law-trained]
readers are extraordinarily busy.”20 She goes on to explain that readers’ attention
level “is greatest in the first several pages, and [] decreases rapidly from then
on,”21 and that “attention levels revive a bit at internal beginnings and endings.”22
It is not clear from the text what an “ordinary” level of busyness is, but the reader
is invited to imagine lawyers and judges as “extraordinarily” busy and impatient.
In his first-year legal writing textbook, Richard K. Neumann creates a not too
different picture of the average lawyer or judge as a reader,23 when he
emphasizes that “lawyers and judges are busy people who do not have time to
wade through poor writing.”24 Thus, Neumann asserts that “[l]egal writing
should give the viewer a quick and clear view, without distractions, of the idea
behind it”25 and must also “be able to withstand attack from what has been call
the ‘reader in bad faith,’” such as “opposing attorney” or “unsympathetic
judge.”26 Neumann further explains that “the reader must make a decision and
wants from you exactly the material needed for the decision – not less and not
more,” and that “the reader is a busy person, must read quickly, and cannot
afford to read twice.”27 Once again, the student is left with the impression that,
more so than other professionals or academics with whom they might be familiar,
lawyers are extraordinarily busy and cannot be expected to “wade through” slowmoving writing.
Textbooks authored by Nancy L. Schulz and Louis J. Sirico, Jr. offer a
similar portrait.28 Schulz and Sirico emphasize that “[m]any lawyers frustrate
19

EDWARDS, supra note 16, at 70-71.
Id. (emphasis added).
21
Id. at 70.
22
Id.
23
NEUMANN, supra note 16, at 53-58.
24
Id. at 52.
25
Id. at 51.
26
Id. at 52.
27
Id.
28
NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., PERSUASIVE WRITING FOR LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1995) [hereinafter SCHULTZ & SIRICO, PERSUASIVE WRITING]; and NANCY L. SCHULTZ
& LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS [hereinafter SCHULTZ &
SIRICO, LEGAL WRITING].
20
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judges by not adequately considering their needs and limitations,” and that
“[j]udges are busy people who need lawyers to give them clear, succinct, wellsupported, and well thought out reasons for deciding a case in a particular
way.”29 Likewise, “the reader is most often a very busy person who does not
have the time or patience to ferret out what you are trying to say.”30 Thus, “if
you do not get to the point immediately, you will lose your reader at the outset.”31
Virtually the same message is delivered in the Shapo textbook; first, the
typical attorney “will be very busy and will have certain expectations that you
must fulfill” when writing a research memorandum.32 As for judges, because
they “play the crucial role in litigation, it is worth your time and effort to
consider carefully what information they need from your trial and appellate
documents, and how that information can be clearly and quickly
communicated.”33 Trial judges are “very busy.”34
Charles Calleros agrees, urging the student to “consider the time pressures
that a supervising attorney or judge faces; neither has time to glean from 20
pages ideas that you could have clearly expressed in 10.”35 Likewise, Mary
Barnard Ray’s text advises that “[t]he reader prefers clarity and readability over
sophistication” and “[t]he reader wants to finish the document quickly.”36
In short, one of the first and clearest messages to emerge from legal writing
textbooks about lawyers is that they are “extraordinarily busy” professionals,
seemingly more busy even than the average professional in the modern world;
and that because of their busy schedules they are unusually impatient readers.37

29

SCHULTZ & SIRICO, PERSUASIVE WRITING, supra note 28, at 83.
Id.
31
SCHULTZ & SIRICO, LEGAL WRITING, supra note 28, at 123.
32
Id. at 142.
33
Id. at 331.
34
Id. at 344.
35
CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 5 (2006).
36
MARY BARNARD RAY, THE BASICS OF LEGAL WRITING 8 (2006).
37
On the other hand, at least one legal writing textbook offers a more nuanced discussion of the
time pressures and attention levels of members of the legal audience, noting, for example, that a
trial judge reading a brief sees the case as “only one of many cases that require the judge’s
attention,” as opposed to an attorney in one’s own firm, who “may take the extra time to try and
30

12

IMAGINING THE LAW-TRAINED READER

B.

The second shared trait:
aggressive about it.

[9/8/2006]

hypercritical, and

A second shared characteristic that some popular legal writing textbooks
ascribe to legal readers is aggressive skepticism. Neumann, for instance, blatantly
describes the legal reader as “aggressively” critical, pointing out that an attorney
may attempt to distort language in an opponent’s writing or that a judge may
purposefully search for misstatements.38 Specifically, “the reader is aggressively
skeptical and – with predatory instincts – will search for any gap or weakness in
your analysis.”39
Edwards similarly refers to lawyers’ aggressive skepticism when instructing
students about the need for “road maps”40 (introductory passages that foreshadow
the structure of the analysis to follow) in legal writing. Edwards acknowledges
that “[m]ost readers want a roadmap,”41 but asserts that “law-trained readers have
an even greater need for an organizational structure.”42 The several reasons for
this greater need among law-trained reader include that (1) “an outline” of the
applicable law is “basic to the way law-trained readers think,”43 (2) “[l]awyers
and judges do not read the law out of intellectual curiosity but because they have
a problem to solve,”44 (3) “a law-trained reader reads skeptically, constantly
assessing the strength and accuracy of the analysis and the credibility of the
writer,”45 and (4) “[l]aw trained readers are not comfortable with organizational
surprises.”46 Edwards further asserts that judges are “particularly [skeptical]”
figure out the analysis you present in a memo.” And at least one legal writing textbook
acknowledges the likelihood that many clients and jury members experience as many great
pressures on their time as lawyers and judges. See BRADLEY G. CLARY & PAMELA LYSAGHT,
SUCCESSFUL LEGAL ANALYSIS AND WRITING: THE FUNDAMENTALS iii (2003) (“[A]udiences these
days [i.e., juries, judges, clients, agencies, colleagues, and adversaries] often share some of the
following characteristics: They are busy. They have too much to do and too little time in which to
do it.”)
38
Id. at 54.
39
Id. at 52.
40
EDWARDS, supra note 16, at 70-71.
41
Id. at 71.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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readers.47 Thus, while acknowledging that most readers find it easier to read text
that opens with a roadmap, Edwards asserts that such foreshadowing is even
more important in legal writing, as an antidote to lawyers’ aggressive skepticism.
Clary and Lysaght also emphasize lawyers’ need to question and think
critically, though they characterize that behavior in less aggressive terms,
describing a good lawyer as “a good investigative reporter,” ferreting out the
“‘who, what, where, when, why, and how’” of the situation, and asking question
after question.48
C.

The third shared trait: formalism.

A third characteristic legal writing textbooks commonly ascribe to lawyers is
personal conservativism, in the sense of an unusual concern with matters of form
and format. The texts make both direct and indirect claims about lawyers’
purported formalism.
1.

Explicit discussion of lawyers’
conservatism” and formalism.

“personal

In an apparent effort to inspire students to be more careful about matters
of form, many of these textbooks devote substantial space to admonishing new
law students about the strictly formalistic outlook of the future readers of their
legal writing. For example, Edwards emphasizes the need to keep the reader’s
inner voice (what she calls the “Commentator”) “relatively quiet,” asserting that,
in particular, judges are even more “personally conservative” than the average
lawyer.49 Neumann attempts to capture the students’ attention with an even more
vivid description, asserting that “the reader will be disgusted by sloppiness,
imprecision, inaccuracy, or anything . . . that hints that you might be unreliable,”
and “will be conservative about matters of grammar, style, citation form, and
47

Id. at 73.
See CLARY & LYSAGHT, supra note 38, at vii-viii (questions for self-critique), 13-15 (questioning
the facts), 32-36 (questioning the law, including breaking a three-element rule into twenty-five
elements). The Shapo text, more like Clary and Lysaght, describes lawyers as possessing “healthy”
but not peculiarly aggressive skepticism. This text also notes that trial judges are bound to follow
the precedents of [the] jurisdiction,” with “questioning minds and healthy skepticism. SHAPO ET
AL., supra note 16, at 344.
49
EDWARDS, supra note 16, at 72-73.
48

14

IMAGINING THE LAW-TRAINED READER

[9/8/2006]

document format.”50 Thus, Neumann adds a dash of inflexibility to the emphasis
on lawyers’ formalism.
The Shapo textbook likewise describes the legal reader as form-conscious.
In addition to expecting “a core of information about the controlling law and its
application to the facts of the problem,” the audience for a memorandum will
also expect “good written English,” specifically “standard written English,”51
which Shapo leaves undefined. A new textbook from Mary Barnard Ray makes
the point plainly and bluntly: “Legal readers are strict about format rules.”52
2.

The formula for organizing legal writing:
IRAC.

In addition to these explicit references, lawyers’ purported bent for strict
formalism gain implicit support from at least one other area of instruction in
these books: the paradigm for legal analysis. These textbooks’ advice to follow
a rather inflexible organizational formula, the so-called “IRAC”53 paradigm or
some variant of it, bolsters the stereotype that lawyers are formalist, even
formulaic, in their thinking.
Many legal textbooks suggest that the IRAC formula is the organizational
and analytical structure that can best be trusted to produce competent legal
analysis. For example, Edwards’ discussion of the legal paradigm opens with the
announcement that “[a] legal rule is analyzed by first identifying and
understanding the governing rule and then applying that rule to a particular set of
50

NEUMANN, supra note 16, at 52 (emphasis added).
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 16, at 142.
52
RAY, supra note 37. Later, Ray advises that with regard to citation rules, “[y]ou may find the
details of the rules frustrating and wonder why they are so particular. The reason . . . is almost
always efficiency or accuracy. For example, legal readers require citations after each sentence
about the law so they can know accurately just how much comes from the cited source and how
much is the writer’s own reasoning.” Id. This well-meaning advice to new students illustrates how
difficult it is for legal writing teachers to make accurate statements about the shared characteristics
of lawyers. The example Ray cites, whether it is necessary to provide a citation for every sentence,
is used by Clary and Lysaght to illustrate that “reasonable people may differ” about such matters.
See CLARY & LYSAGHT, supra note 38.
53
Douglas Litowitz argues that using IRAC system as a writing technique “creates the misleading
impression that legal writing involves primarily the application of pre-existing rules to a static set
of facts.” LITOWITZ, supra note 8, at 739.
51
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facts. First you must explain the rule; then you must apply that rule to the
facts.”54 Thus, the paradigm is embraced as “the paradigm for legal analysis,”55
even though the text later acknowledges that “[k]eeping the halves distinct does
not mean that while you are engaged in the process of writing the paradigm you
must complete rule explanation before you attempt to write any rule
application.”56
The Edwards text goes on to identify two sections and five individual
components of a “paradigm for a working draft.”57 The first section, “Rule
Explanation,” has three components:
Conclusion: State your conclusion about the issue.
Rule: State the applicable rule of law.
Rule Explanation: Explain the rule.58
The second section , “Rule Application,” has two components:
Rule Application: Apply the rule to your client’s facts.
Conclusion: Restate your conclusion.59
The text then provides direction about how to write each component. As for
the conclusion, “[l]aw-trained readers are impatient to learn your answer, so the
first thing your reader will want to see is your conclusion.”60 Edwards then
suggests an “introductory paragraph,” restating the conclusion in two or three

54

EDWARDS, supra note 16, at 89.
Id. at 90 (emphasis added.)
56
Id. at 90.
57
Id. at 89.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 90.
55
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sentences.61 After that, “state the governing rule,” which “[u]sually . . . should be
the first sentence in the first paragraph after the introductory paragraph.”62
Edwards concedes that “[o]ccasionally . . . an issue is complex enough to
require a little context or clarification before stating the rule,” but emphasizes the
importance of stating the rule “as quickly as you can,” not only because the
reader is impatient, but also because “the discipline of concisely stating the rule
immediately after the conclusion is an important part of your analytical
process.”63 The stated rule should be “the focal point of the first half of the
analysis.”64
The rest of the first half of the analysis should explain “where the rule comes
from and what it means,” by covering five “interrelated” steps: (1) “[s]how how
the authorities demonstrate that the rule is what you say it is,” (2) “[e]xplain the
rule’s purpose or the policies it serves,” (3) “[e]xplain how the rule has been
applied in the past, (4) “[e]xplain any additional characteristics that will affect
how the rule may be applied,” such as burdens of proof, and (5) “[t]o the extent
necessary, explain any other possible understanding of the rule.”65 This last step,
“sometimes called ‘counter-analysis’ or ‘counter-explanation,’” is necessary “[i]n
persuasive writing . . . [if it] is reasonably likely to arise.”66
Neumann’s text encourages students to adopt a similar organizational
strategy in their writing. In the opening paragraphs discussing organization of
legal analysis, the text asserts that a legal analysis delivered in the same order in
which it was reasoned out, that is, facts-law-conclusion, is not an analysis that
“could be read by another lawyer.”67 Neumann asserts that something about the
presentation must change to make the analysis appropriate for the law-trained
audience. The text goes on to say that the appropriate paradigm for this legal
audience is to “prove a conclusion of law and the facts in ways that convince the
reader that your conclusion is the right one.”68 Once again, the formalist
61

Id.
Id. at 92.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 92-93.
66
Id. at 93
67
NEUMANN, supra note 16.
68
NEUMANN, supra note 16, at 100.
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approach is portrayed as necessary to appease the rigid reader, as lawyers and
judges will “both look for a tightly structured analysis that makes your
conclusion seem inevitable.”69
Moreover, Neumann suggests that these readers need the information
underlying the analysis to be delivered in a particular order: “first . . . your
conclusion . . . ; then the main rule (or rules) on which your conclusion is based;
next, proof and explanation that the rule exists and that you have stated it
accurately; and then application of that subsidiary rules to the facts.”70 The
author explains later in the chapter “Why Readers Prefer This Type of
Organization”:71
Remember that all of your readers will be practical and skeptical
people and will be reading your memorandum or brief because
they must make a decision.
State your conclusion first because a practical and busy reader
needs to know that you are trying to support before you start
supporting it. . . . Effective writers usually state their conclusions
boldly at the beginning of a Discussion or Argument. . . . This
may take some getting used to. It is contrary to the way writing
is often done in college. And most of us have been socialized
since childhood to state a conclusion only after a proof – even in
the most informal situations – to avoid appearing opinionated,
arrogant, or confrontational. . . .
State the rule next because, after reading a conclusion of law, the
skeptical law-trained mind instinctively wants to know what
principles of law require that conclusion instead of others. After
all, the whole idea of law is that things are to be done according
to the rules.
Then prove and explain the rule because the reader will refuse to
follow you further until you have established that rule is really
69

Id.
Id. at 100-101.
71
Id. at 103.
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law the way you say it is and until you have educated the reader
somewhat on how the rule works. The skeptical law-trained
mind will not accept a rule statement as genuine unless it has
been proved with authority. . . .
Apply the rule last because that is the only thing left. . . .72
Other authors offer similar formulaic approaches to organizing legal analysis
in writing. Schultz and Sirico explain that “the way to organize is to write
according to an outline and to put your conclusions first.”73 And Shapo presents
a pattern that is a “fairly standard format for fact-based legal problems because it
logically orders the steps necessary in this type of legal reasoning.”74 After
briefly acknowledging that issues involving “the meaning or the validity of a law,
for example,” may require a variation of the pattern, Shapo asserts that
[A] useful pattern for analyzing a single legal issue often has the following
structure:
1. Explanation of the applicable rule of law
2. Examination of how the rules is applied in the relevant precedents
3. Application of the law to the facts of your case and comparison with the
precedents
4. Presentation and evaluation of counterarguments
5. Conclusion75
According to Shapo, “[a]dherence to this pattern ensures that the reader gets
necessary information in an order which is readily understandable. You should
not begin the discussion with a summary of the facts of your case . . . because the

72

Id. at 103.
SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 28.
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SHAPO, supra note 16, at 113.
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Id. at 114.
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reader cannot assess the legal significance of those facts without your having first
explained the controlling rules and examined the relevant case law . . . .”76
The introductory summary of the paradigm in the Shapo text differs from the
summaries of the paradigm in Edwards and Neumann, but those differences are
less significant than they first appear. Specifically, though Shapo does not
indicate that the writer’s conclusion must be stated at the outset of the analysis,
this difference is less significant than it seems at first because in the following
chapter, Shapo indicates that an entire “thesis paragraph” should begin the legal
analysis.77 In the thesis paragraph, the writer should set forth her “reasoned
conclusion” of law after introducing the client’s claim and the legal issues
involved.78
Like other texts, Shapo’s text describes in some detail exactly the sort and
even number of sentences that should appear within each component of the
paradigm. First, “[t]he discussion of a particular legal issue should begin with a
sentence or one or more paragraphs that set forth and explain the governing rule
of law.”79 Then, after analyzing the governing rule of law,
your next step is to examine the relevant case law from which
that rule came or in which it has been applied. In a fact-based
problem, you should recount the relevant facts of the precedents
because it is by identifying how the rules of law were applied to
the facts of those cases that you give the rules meaning.80
Then, “you should set out and evaluate the similarities and differences
between the precedent and your case and determine their importance. . . . [and]
should also apply the reasoning or policies of a decided case to your own case.”81
After giving appropriate consideration to counterargument, “[t]he final sentence
should be the legal conclusion, a conclusion grounded in the prior analysis of the
law, precedent, and facts. This conclusion differs from the one given in the
76

Id.
Id. at 131.
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Id. at 117.
77

20

IMAGINING THE LAW-TRAINED READER

[9/8/2006]

thesis paragraph . . . . [which] offers an assessment of a client’s overall chance of
winning a suit or defending himself against a charge.”82
In short, many first-year legal writing textbooks instruct students to adopt an
extremely formulaic approach to organizing writing about legal problems.
3.

IRAC as the formula for legal reasoning.

Some passages in these texts seem to go beyond offering the formula as
merely an organizational tool, to presenting the IRAC formula (or similar
formulas) as a sort of jurisprudence, an embodiment of the process of legal
analysis – assuming, for instance, that legal analysis revolves around identifiable
rules, and that legal reasoning is a clockwork process of articulating the
appropriate rule and then applying it to the material facts that present themselves.
For example, Edwards’ discussion of the first half of the paradigm
(explanation of the rule), seems to assume that one or more rules can be readily
identified to govern any legal issue, and that articulating the rule only rarely
requires context or clarification. This advice, that the first half of any written
legal analysis should state and then explain an identifiable “rule,” is balanced to
some degree by other portion of the Edwards text, which presents a more
complex view of legal analysis. In chapter five of her book, “Forms of Legal
Reasoning,” Edwards describes “a number of kinds of logical reasoning”
common in the law.83 These include “rule-based reasoning,” “analogical
reasoning,” “policy-based reasoning,” “custom-based reasoning,” and “principlebased reasoning.”84 Edwards also acknowledges another “way lawyers advocate
for a result: narrative,”85 noting that although “[t]oday, we usually use the term
‘reasoning’ to describe only logical processes like those described above, . . . an
earlier understanding of ‘reasoning’ was much broader . . . . [and] included
processes that transcend logical arguments and may even resemble intuition.”86
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Id. at 119.
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Nonetheless, Edwards makes clear that rules are at the top of the hierarchy of
these forms of reasoning, at least in the rule and rule-explanation portions of the
paradigm.87 It is only in the second half of the analytical paradigm that Edwards
advises students to incorporate other, non-rule based forms of reasoning.
Yet even in advising how to write the rule application section, Edwards
begins with the advice that “this half of the paradigm uses the deductive format
of syllogistic reasoning – that is, applying a general, often abstract principle to a
particular situation and arriving at a conclusion.”88 Thus, “rule-based reasoning
is still important,” but “narrative, analogical, . . . policy and principle-based . . . ,
and custom-based reasoning are at least as important.”89
Edwards’ specific advice about how to complete the rule application further
diminishes the importance of non-rule based reasoning. She advises that “a
written legal analysis ultimately should be framed in tightly reasoned logic,”
though acknowledging that the structure might be less tight during the drafting
process.90 She also suggests that some might begin “by focusing on the
narrative” with “the rule in mind, but more impressionistically so.”91 In the end,
though, “revise [the two halves] so the rule explained in the first half matches the
rule applied in the second half,” with “the end result . . . [of] a logical analysis
built upon a narrative theme.”92
Neumann’s textbook also implies that the formula is more than an
organizational tool. Neumann acknowledges that the paradigm may sometimes
be varied,93 but limits the variations: (1) “you can vary the sequence in which the
components appear,” (2) “in the rule proof and in rule application, you can vary
the depth of your explanation to suit the amount of skepticism you expect from
the reader,” and (3) you can combine separately paradigmed analyses into a
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Id. (“[r]ule-based reasoning is the starting point for legal analysis”).
Id. at 101.
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unified explanation of several issues and sub-issues.”94 None of the variations
refer to the use of non-rule based reasoning to create a more in-depth argument.
Similarly, instruction in the Shapo text supports a factory-like, rule-to-result
form of legal analysis, even though the Shapo text presents the paradigm as
somewhat less settled and absolute than it seems to be in Edwards and Neumann.
At the outset, the Shapo test takes a less strident approach about the writer’s need
to follow the suggested paradigm; the authors merely “suggest [that this]
organizational pattern [] will enable you to write a clear analysis” of an issue.”95
Also, throughout the description of how to write according to the paradigm, the
authors repeatedly acknowledge that the writer will have to make decisions about
what is appropriate to the particular legal discussion at issue.96
Shapo does describe the paradigm as “a fairly standard format for fact-based
legal problems because it logically orders the steps necessary in this type of legal
reasoning,” and strongly recommends that students “adhere[]” to the paradigm,
because this is an order “in which it is readily understandable.” Also, despite the
repeated emphasis on the need for the writer to consider the requirements of the
particular legal analysis at issue, the Shapo text is even more specific than
Edwards or Neumann about what should appear in particular sentences. The
suggestion that the first and last sentences of written legal analysis should always
cover the same basic content creates the impression that the analysis structure is
formalistic, even formulaic.
In summary, instruction regarding rigid adherence to the IRAC paradigm in
ordering paragraphs and even sentences throughout written legal analysis lends
further support to the depiction in these textbooks of lawyers as almost foolishly
formalistic in their approach. As Neumann states, “the whole idea of law is that
things are to be done according to rules,” and in these textbooks even the process
of legal reasoning seems to be governed by rule.

94

Id.
SHAPO, supra note 16.
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For example, they state that “for most issues . . . you will need to break your analysis into parts,”
but suggest that a single paragraph sometimes will cover all of the parts. Id. at 114.
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What Is the Trouble with Relying on this Image of the LawTrained Reader?

One possible response to these textbooks’ reliance on such generalizations
and formulas in legal writing education is simply, “so what.” Legal writing
textbooks do not embody the whole of legal writing education, and the legal
writing teachers who use these textbooks surely supplement the reading with
classroom discussions about the audience and purpose for each particular writing
assignment.
Additionally, one might ask, even if these generalizations about the “lawtrained reader” are not accurate, 97 (and even if one does not think that these traits
of impatience, aggression, and formalism are always, necessarily, traits of good
lawyering), what harm can these generalizations really do? Legal writing
teachers must say something about the audience for which their students expect
to be writing, and none of us can have a completely accurate perspective of the
complicated, diverse audience students will face. Given the situation legal
97

It seems obvious that such broad generalizations cannot accurately describe the attitudes and
preferences of the individual lawyers, judges, and other readers whom our students encounter. And
though the available studies of law-trained readers’ preferences about legal writing do suggest a
shared desire for concise, clear writing, none of the studies establishes overwhelming impatience,
aggression, or formalism as shared traits. For example, one study recently “surveyed members of
the academy, bench, and bar to see what they thought of the writing skills of law graduates,” Susan
Hanley Kosse and David T. ButleRitchie, How Judges, Practitioners, and Legal Writing Teachers
Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A Comparative Study, 53 J. Legal Educ. 80, 80
(2003), and found agreement among all three groups agree that “most legal writing is weak,” id. at
85, and that “clarity and concision [rank as] the two most essential elements of good writing,” id.
Other interesting surveys of various portions of the legal audience include Bryan A. Garner, Judges
on Briefing: a National Survey, 8 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1, 2-3 (2002) (surveying state and federal
judges and discovering that they tend to believe that “[a] brief should be an essay with a clear train
of thought” as opposed to “a repository of all the information that a curious judge might want to
know about the case”); Susan McClellan and Constance Krontz, Improving Legal Writing Courses:
Perspectives from the Bar and Bench, 8 Leg. Writing 201, 203, 222 (2002) (surveying “judges and
practicing attorneys who supervise the work of first-year associates or judicial law clerks” and
concluding from the survey responses that, among other things, “[law school] training should
emphasize how to organize a coherent legal argument that moves smoothly, persuasively, and
concisely from one point to the next”); Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal
Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 Leg. Writing 257, 284 (2002) (surveying
federal judges and concluding that “advocates need to engage in hard-hitting, intelligent, and
honest legal analysis” using “‘tried and true’ organizational forms” and being “concise and clear”);
David Lewis, Common Knowledge about Appellate Briefs: True or False?, 6 J. App. Prac. &
Process 331 (Fall 2004) (surveying appellate judges about their preferences in appellate briefs).
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writing teachers find themselves in, one might argue that the best legal writing
teachers can do is to discuss the topic of audience in general terms, and assume
that through their writing assignments and later experiences students will learn to
modify their writing appropriately for different audiences they encounter.
To the contrary, I think that the tendency in these popular textbooks to overgeneralize about “what lawyers are like” is a serious concern. Legal writing
education is important, and legal writing teachers can do better.
A.

Reliance on generalizations about the audience for
legal writing is an ineffective way to help students
improve their legal writing.

It is easy to imagine why legal writing teachers might tend to over-generalize
about the personalities of practicing lawyers in their classrooms. Members of the
legal writing field themselves remain unsure about the field’s substance, about
whether “legal writing” is a legitimate field of scholarship different from the
substance of the topical law courses.98 And in this uncertain, insecure context,
information about the preferences of the audience for whom students will be
writing is one area of information over which legal writing teachers have some
legitimate claim to specialized knowledge. Most of us were hired specifically
because of our expertise in legal writing, in particular because of our practice
experience and success with legal writing. Indeed, some legal writing teachers
may consider their knowledge of “what lawyers are like,” and in particular,
“what lawyers like in legal writing,” as the basis for all of their teaching and
scholarship, as their reason for being part of the law school.99

98

For an interesting discussion of the traditional (and somewhat paradoxical) opinions about legal
writing education and why it should remain separate and different from the rest of the law school
curriculum, see Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2, critiquing the views that “writing is writing,”
at 41-42, “writing can’t be taught,” at 43-44, “writing is ancillary to the real law,” at 44-45, “legal
writing is legal drafting,” at 46-47, and “teaching legal writing is anti-intellectual,” at 47-48.
And for a recent view, from a legal writing teacher, that “the substance of legal writing itself [is
not] a viable field for legal scholarship, because of the lack of a doctrinal-law basis for the subject,”
see Mitchell Nathanson, Taking the Road Less Travelled: Why Practical Scholarship Makes Sense
for the Legal Writing Professor, 11 LEGAL WRITING 329, 330 n. 5 (2005).
99
See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 99, at 358 (arguing that “the wealth of practical knowledge
stored within the combined legal writing professoriate should be tapped so as to enable us to step in
and help round out the modern law students' legal education).
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Even teachers who do not consider their opinions about “what lawyers are
like” to be the primary basis for their teaching might think it necessary to discuss
generalizations about the audience as the first step in the “process” approach to
teaching writing. Identification of demographic and other information about the
nature of the audience is often suggested as a first step in the “process” approach
to writing education,100 an approach that made strong inroads into legal writing
pedagogy in the 1980’s and 1990’s.101
Yet another pedagogical reason for relying on these traits is to motivate
students to write more clearly and concisely and be more careful about matters of
form. In particular, the emphasis on lawyers’ impatience in the textbooks
discussed above seems aimed at motivating students to write clearly and
concisely. 102 Likewise, the texts’ emphasis that lawyers are strict about errors of
form and format could be aimed at motivating students to follow those rules in
their legal writing assignments.103
Other, non-pedagogical reasons may also help explain legal writing teachers’
tendency to opine about “what lawyers are like.” Despite recent gains, legal
writing teachers remain at most schools on a separate and unequal track of the
legal academy.104 Yet, the average legal writing professor has more practice
experience than the average doctrinal professor.105 Legal writing teachers’
greater experience with other lawyers in practice might cause them to feel
especially confident about their teaching as it relates to knowledge of “what
lawyers are like” in practice settings.106 Claiming expertise about “what lawyers
100

See Reiff, supra note 6, at 101-02.
See Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2.
102
See supra section I(A).
103
See supra section I(C).
104
ALWD SURVEY 2006.
105
See Nathanson, supra note 99 at 338 (describing survey finding that legal writing professors
had, on average, 7.4 years of law firm practice experience, while so-called “doctrinal” professors
averaged 3.5 years of such experience).
106
See id. at 375-76 (“Legal writing professors first need to recognize their unique area of expertise
among law faculties, and then stand up and be counted. A concerted effort needs to be made to
highlight our unique skills to our administrations and doctrinal colleagues and to impress upon
them the scholarly importance of these skills. It is crucial that they understand that although our
skills may make us different than them, they do not make us lesser scholars or our presence on our
faculties any less vital to the education of our students and service to the greater legal
community.”)
101
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are like,” and even more specifically, “what lawyers like in their writing,” legal
writing teachers may feel they have legitimate authority.
Unfortunately, legal writing teachers’ claim to authority regarding “what
lawyers are like” is suspect. A fundamental problem is that each of us only has
limited experience from which to draw. Our own practice experience, no matter
how long and varied it might have been, is necessarily limited to the experience
of one human being in a series of specific professional contexts. Transmitting
that experience to our students cannot be sufficient to prepare students for the
wide variety of experiences they will face in their own professional lives.
Whatever generalizations we might have reached in our own minds about “what
lawyers are like.” based on own experiences, those generalizations will never be
a perfect match for the varied context our students will find themselves in. In
fact, if such generalizations are all we have to offer, they might not be much help
at all, at least not for students who practice in different areas than we did.
Reasoning similarly, composition scholars have attacked the idea of
“audience analysis” as it developed in some process approaches to English
composition education, at least to the extent audience analysis “posits an abstract,
generalizable collectivity.”107 These critics argue that “[i]nstead of giving writers
a ‘one-size-fits-all-readers’ approach to audience, [writing teachers] need to
enable them to navigate the multiple reading roles that they will likely encounter
as communicators in various disciplinary and professional contexts.”108
The same criticism could be leveled at the characterizations of the “lawtrained reader” in the legal writing textbooks surveyed in section I. Instead of
giving legal writers a one-size-fits-all-readers approach to the audience of lawtrained readers, legal writing teachers should enable students to navigate the
multiple reading roles they are likely to encounter in various professional
contexts after law school. In the effort to help students learn to navigate those
roles and contexts, legal writing teachers can and should share their own
professional experiences. But to suggest that what students need to keep in mind
when imagining those roles and contexts is a set of shared traits like impatience,
aggression, and formalism, seems unlikely to be of much help.

107
108

See Reiff, supra note 6, at 102.
Id. at 104.
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Indeed, the fact that many students probably find such generalizations about
the audience unhelpful is another problem with relying on the generalizations.
At least some students probably recognize almost immediately that the truth
about “what lawyers are like” is much more complicated and interesting than
over-generalizations like these.109 Such critical thinking fortunately should help
inoculates students from the risk of indoctrination or pressure to conform to the
over-generalizations.110 But it also should lead such students to doubt legal
writing teachers’ credibility.
And students should question the teaching that lawyers are impatient,
aggressive, hyper-formalists. These traits themselves are not necessary, or even
good, aspects of being a lawyer, at least not in all contexts. For example, as for
impatience – of course lawyers, like so many professionals today, feel busy and
time-pressured, and of course they become impatient with unclear, disorganized,
or wordy writing. But at the same time, much legal work demands great
patience, such as patience with the tedium of reading legal opinions and statutes;
and patience to hear the stories of clients or litigants, listening well enough to ask
the important questions. A particular lawyer’s impatience while reading a
particular memo thus should not be attributed to the fact that lawyers are
extraordinarily impatient people.
Likewise, with aggressive criticism; of course legal analysis demands that we
think critically about the basis for a legal argument, breaking it down into its
component parts, looking for holes in it. And of course some contexts demand
that some lawyers behave aggressively, zealously advocating for their client’s
rights and desires. At the same time, we can easily imagine other situations and
contexts in which a lawyer’s ability to find common ground with adversaries or
among competing interests is more important, such as when litigation is first
threatened against a client. Thus, a particular reader’s aggressive criticism while
reading a particular legal document is not wholly attributable to the fact that the
reader went to law school.

109

Some students probably know a few lawyers who are patient, consensus-oriented, or a little
sloppy in matters of form. Some may know lawyers who exhibit all three traits, and yet still
manage to have fairly successful careers as lawyers. For instance, students have occasionally
questioned me about some of these generalizations in their textbooks during office hours, or after
class.
110
See infra section II(B).
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Perhaps the worst thing about relying on such faulty over-generalizations
about “what lawyers are like” is the missed opportunity for real learning. If in
our textbooks and our classrooms we paint the “law-trained reader” with such a
broad brush, even if we do not convince students that our image of the audience
is accurate, we still miss an opportunity to model the sort of critical thinking we
should be helping our students learn. We also miss an opportunity to help
students practice grappling with the “complex and shifting roles of readers”111 of
their legal writing.
In short, legal writing education would be more effective if, instead of
teaching students to imagine a monolithic audience with shared traits such as
impatience, aggression, and formalism, it engaged students in more complicated,
careful thought about the audience for legal writing. Legal writing education
should acknowledge the multiple perspectives and motivations that different
lawyers bring to the varied reading roles and contexts they face in the profession.
B.

Reliance on generalizations about the audience for
legal writing creates unnecessary and inequitable
pressure to conform.

Even if teaching about generalized traits were an effective way to help
students to learn to write about the law, there remains another problem with these
textbooks’ over-generalizations about the law-trained reader. Because legal
writing education focuses so explicitly on helping students develop the skills to
explore and create legal discourse – that is, the vocabulary, evidence, and
arguments that can succeed in the law, that other lawyers will recognize as
“legal” – our teaching runs a particular risk of devolving into indoctrination in
the current conventions of legal discourse.112
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Reiff, supra note 6, at 102.
See Stanchi, supra note 8, at 10 (“In the legal writing context, the dilemma for the teacher is
whether the teacher should ‘socialize’ the student to the culture and language of law, thereby
risking that the already marginalized will be further marginalized. . . . . [thereby] contributing to the
suppression of certain unique and valuable voices, cultures and concepts in law, and ensuring that
law remains a language of power and privilege. On the other hand, if students are not socialized,
have legal writing teachers ‘set up’ already marginalized students to fail in legal practice?”)
See also Baker, supra note 12, at 516-17 (emphasizing the “great[] challenge to meet the
expectations of socialized and privileged legal decision-makers,” who are “infused with the
hegemonic rules of culture and law; [and] have conscious and unconscious perspectives, ideologies,
112
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Of course many, perhaps even most, lawyers are busy professionals, of
course legal analysis requires critical thinking and analysis, and of course law
practice sometimes requires precise attention to nitpicky formal rules. But there
is also a place in law practice for patience, consensus, and pragmatism.113 Do we
really think that almost all lawyers are so extraordinarily busy, so much busier
than other modern-day professionals? Do we really think most of them read, say,
the average office memo, with an aggressively critical eye? Do we really think
most of them care much about citation format, or the occasional typographical
error? And even if we answer all of these questions “yes,” do we really want our
students to be these kinds of lawyers?
Concern that legal education could silence or distort law students’ voices and
ultimately their contributions to the development of the law is a familiar theme in
recent legal scholarship, including scholarship about legal writing. For example,
the Texas Law Review published in 1988 a colloquy on “Human Voice in Legal
Discourse.”114 In his essay opening the colloquy, Voices, Julius Getman asserts
that legal education is focused mostly on helping students to develop a
“‘professional voice,’ the essence of which is addressing questions of justice
through the analysis of legal rules.”115 He claims that legal education
overemphasizes the professional voice (and related voices, the critical and
scholarly voices) at the expense of the so-called “‘human voice,’ by which [he
means] language that uses ordinary concepts and familiar situations without
professional ornamentation to analyze legal issues.”116
Although Getman acknowledges that “it is desirable, indeed crucial, that
legal education teach professional voice and that legal scholarship utilizes it,”117
and commitments favoring the status quo and privileging certain narrative accounts, social rules,
and forms of reasoning and argumentation.”)
113
See, e.g., Guinier ET AL., supra note 8, at 84-87 (suggesting that “in light of the changing
character of the legal profession” and the disparately negative impact of law teaching on female
law students, the time has come “to reexamine traditional assumptions about lawyering,” including
the ranking of students “by testing analytical thinking exclusively in the abstract,” “focus[ing] on
legal issues exclusively or primarily in the context of . . . litigation,” and the fact that “a
contemporary attorney may need more than the ability to spot issues or engage in quick-response
timed legal analysis, as measured by blind-graded examinations.”)
114
Julius G. Getman, Voices 66 Tex. L. Rev. 577-646 (1988).
115
Getman, supra note 115, at 577.
116
Id. at 582.
117
Id. at 578.
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he argues that an “imbalance,”118 namely the “undervaluing of ‘human voice,’”119
is bad for legal education, and bad for the law.120 Getman makes a particularly
convincing case against elitism in academia, noting that “[a]cademics sometimes
act as though thinking, intellectual creativity, and enthusiasm for ideas are the
special province of the professionally certified,” and recounting his personal
experience, in his own home as a child of parents who lacked any formal
education and in his work with steelworkers and other workers. 121 He notes, for
example, that he has never found “a group of workers too simple to understand
the intricacies of the law.”122

118

Id. at 577.
Id. at 582.
120
For instance, discussing Susan Estrich’s article Rape, which begins with the author’s description
of her own experience as a rape victim, Getman focuses on the contrast between the voices of the
victim and the judges in Rusk v. State. See id. at 586-87. Quoting Estrich’s article, Getman
provides the following passages, the first in the rape victim’s human voice, the second in the
professional voice of the judges issuing their opinion that the victim did not resist sufficently:
I said, ‘you can get a lot of other girls down there, for what you want,’ and he
just kept saying, ‘no,’ and then I was really scared, because I can’t describe,
you know, what was said. It was more the look in his eyes; and I said, at that
point I didn’t know what to say; and I said, ‘If I do what you want, will you let
me go without killing me?’ Because I didn’t know, at that point, what he was
going to do; and I started to cry; and when I did, he put his hands on my throat,
and started lightly to choke me; and I said, ‘If I do what you want, will you let
me go?’ And he said, yes, and at that time, I proceeded to do what he wanted
me to do.
***
While courts no longer require a female to resist to the utmost or to resist
where resistance would be foolhardy, they do require her acquiescence in the
act of intercourse to stem from fear generated by something of substance. She
may not simply say, ‘I was really scared,’ and thereby transform consent or
mere unwillingness into submission by force. These words do not transform a
seducer into a rapist. She must follow the natural instinct of every proud
female to resist, by more than mere words, the violation of her person by a
stranger or an unwelcomed friend. She must make it plain that she regards
such sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.
Getman notes that “[i]t is difficult not to be outraged at the calm use of professional voice in this
[second] passage or to wonder what motivation lies behind it....” Id. (footnotes omitted).
121
Getman, supra note 115, at 587. In the same passage, Getman points out that “the issue of voice
in legal discourse is related to a deeper issue: the relationship between ideas and credentials,” id.
122
Id. at 588.
119
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Getman’s concerns seem particularly apt for legal writing teachers trying to
help students imagine the audience for their future writing. As Getman implies,
there is usually no logical reason that lawyers cannot use an ordinary “human”
voice to communicate their arguments about the law. To the extent we teach our
students that they must write especially concisely or organize each paragraph and
sentence according to some particular formula, in order to successfully meet the
shared expectations of law-trained readers, we not only mislead them, we might
discourage them from using their own “human voice” to communicate about the
law. Silencing those voices not only harms our students, it harms the law.
Worse yet, we probably discourage some voices disproportionately. Kathryn
Stanchi has presented a forceful critique of legal writing pedagogy’s tendency to
“mute” the voices of groups traditionally underrepresented in the law.123 She
notes that legal writing education has developed a “dual strategy” that focuses
both on the process of producing legal communication for a particular
audience,124 and the “acculturation of the novice legal communicator into the
legal ‘discourse community’ through the learning of legal vocabulary, legal
customs, and legal culture.”125 Neither the process focus nor the socialization
focus, however, offers much opportunity to engage students in critical thought
about the audience they are writing for, or the vocabulary, customs, and culture
they are asked to adopt:
Consistent with their goals of teaching effective lawyering ‘in
the real world,’ neither . . . pedagogy questions the validity or
motives of the external rules imposed by the audience, language,
or context of law. Their purpose is to ease the students’ entry
into the community, not to challenge the customs or culture of
the community.”126
Stanchi emphasizes how consistently “legal writing teaches that the most
persuasive frameworks and theories tend to be those that are most
123

Stanchi, supra note 8, at 9 (“because legal writing pedagogy reflects the biases in legal language
(including legal reasoning), its effectiveness in ‘socializing’ law students comes at the price of
suppressing the voices of those who have already been historically marginalized by legal language”
(footnote omitted)).
124
Id. at 8-9.
125
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
126
Id. at 22.
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mainstream,”127 citing advice in the Edwards textbook, already mentioned in this
article, that “[l]awyers as a group tend to be personally conservative . . . . [and
t]his is particularly true of judges.”128 Her call for a more critical approach in the
legal writing classroom applies especially forcefully to legal writing education
that directly instructs students that the law-trained audience shares the
stereotyped, traditional traits of impatience, hyper-criticism, and formalism. As
Stanchi points out, the payoff of a more critical approach would be double:
not only will we teach our students to challenge biased language
and send them out to the legal market with the tools they need to
succeed and the encouragement to stretch language and think
outside the box, but in doing so, we can make law school—and
law practice—a less alienating place.”129
Interestingly, recent sociological research exploring alienation among
students at professional schools suggests that the process of developing a
professional identity during the first year of law school does indeed have a
disproportionately negative impact on female law students, especially students of
color.130 Working from the theory that professional study teaches not only
specialized skills and knowledge of a profession, but also “the acquisition of an
appropriate professional identity,”131 Carrie Yang Costello sought to examine
whether “the process of incorporating a new professional identity varied for
people with different personal identities.”132 Her research confirmed the
hypothesis that “[s]tudents arrived with their wardrobes shaped by naive
conceptions of their chosen professions, but quickly absorbed socializing
messages from their school settings and professors.”133
Moreover, while nearly all of the observed students exhibited “identity
dissonance,” that is, “the disconcerting experience of conflict between
127

Id. at 27.
Id.
129
Id. at 56-57.
130
See generally Yang Costello, supra note 10.
131
Id. at 139. Note that Costello points out that each of us possesses “multiple identities – be those
of gender, race and ethnicity, and religion; class identities, sexual identities, political identities,
familial identities, and so forth.” Id. at 139.
128

132
133

Id. at 143.
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irreconcilable aspects of their self-concepts,”134 Costello observed “gendered and
raced trends” in students’ behavior.135 Her findings offer some additional support
for the critiques of Stanchi and others,136 suggesting that those who do not selfidentify with the traditional image of the lawyer feel torn between their personal
and professional identities.137 Costello’s findings thus suggest that if legal
writing education sends the message that lawyers are impatient, aggressive, and
formalistic, we might expect some students in legal writing courses to struggle to
with abandoning their prior identities in favor of those traits.

134

Id. at 140.
See Yang Costello, supra note 10. For example, at the law school, a white male student from an
upper-middle-class background “relaxed into his new setting” quickly, leaving his long khaki
slacks and long-sleeved button-down shirt for khaki shorts and a plain knit polo. Id. at 144. A
white female student, in contrast, arrived at school “wearing a rather dramatic business outfit,” and
quickly “dressed herself down” to plain khaki pants and simple shifts, nothing feminine-looking.
Id. at 145. The experience of an African-American female student was more complex. She arrived
at school looking “businesslike, but in a dramatic, feminine, and ethnically marked way,” wearing a
brightly colored dress and matching jacket,” braided hair, and jewelry that included African animal
charms. Id. at 146. Soon, this student straightened and cut her hair into a simple blunt cut, and
began wearing more delicate jewelry. She did not, however, change her style of clothing, and
Costello theorized that the reason is that “a female law student of African descent is caught in a
double bind: penalized professionally for her gender when she appears feminine, but penalized due
to her race when she does not.” Id.
136
Some feminists, for example, have argued that legal education works to exclude women. For
instance, in Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, Lani
Guinier, Ann Bartow, and three other women presented their study of grades, survey data, written
narratives, and interviews, demonstrating “that men outperform[ed] men at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School,” during the period of the study; and suggesting that women felt
excluded from both the formal and informal education environments of the law school, and
experienced adverse psychological effects and reduced employment opportunities as a result. Lani
Guinier ET AL., supra note 8, at 6. The article’s description of the characteristics students felt
forced to emulate echos to some extent the image of the law-trained reader in legal writing
textbooks:
Second only to the skills of “objectivity, students report that over time they
have learned to stop caring about others and have become more conservative.
Some men indicate that they have grown more aggressive and abrasive over
their three years in law school; some women see themselves as more “humble”
and “nitpicking.” Id. at 51.
135

137

Costello emphasizes that negative identity dissonance occurs in “individuals who prefer their
personal identity to the conflicting professional identity,” while those who “prefer their fledgling
professional identities” experience identity dissonance in a positive way, “as if they are ‘finding
themselves’ at professional school.” Id. at 152.
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In summary, recognizing that our students are in the midst of creating, or recreating, their own identities, legal writing teachers should not lightly throw out
any generalizations about “what lawyers are like.” In particular, we should not
suggest to our students that these over-generalized traits of impatience,
aggression, and formalism are necessary to success after law school.
III.

Avoiding Over-Generalizations About the Law-Trained
Reader Improves Legal Writing Education.

If legal writing textbooks and legal writing teachers stopped inviting students
to imagine the audience for their writing as extraordinarily impatient, aggressive
critics, red pens and format guides in hand, what instead should they say about
law-trained readers? More critical, careful, reflective methods would better assist
students in learning to grapple with the complex audiences and purposes for their
writing.
As we develop better methods to help students imagine and write for the
audience for their writing, legal writing professors might take inspiration from
Getman’s Voices,138 and seek to welcome the “human voice” in the law. As they
stand, legal writing textbooks do not seem much to welcome or include the
human voice. In a related vein, writing an essay for a symposium on narrative in
legal writing,139 James R. Elkins has observed that “[w]ith the exclusive focus on
technique, form, and structure in legal writing texts one experiences an eerie
absence of the soul of the writing enterprise - a person who writes.”140 He
wonders and worries specifically about the “lifeless instruction manual” at the
base of many legal writing courses, the legal writing textbook:
One wonders how, in the enormity of structure and process, legal
writing texts might affect the novice legal writer. How can one
learn to write, to experience legal writing first-hand, to know
struggle, failure, and the wonder of words and rules of law made
into argument, when the task(s) of writing are provoked by and
connected to a life-less instruction manual? (The most traditional
of law school case books are filled with cases, and in turn, with
people who have stories to tell, even if these stories have been
138

See Getman, supra note 115.
Elkins, supra note 10.
140
Id. at 107.
139
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severely "edited" by law.) What kind of invitation do legal
writing texts extend to a student, or to any one of us, concerned
that law be a humanistic and liberal art?
....
Reading these texts, I experienced a strong desire to flee, to find
a place, any place where I could think about writing and learn
the writing of legal argument free of these soulless texts. In this
momentary feeling of being outsized, alone, and wishing to be
elsewhere, I suspect a forewarning of the ways in which we
isolate and disempower students who seek (in the most hopeful
fashion) to learn the skills of writing associated with lawyering.
Where does the legal writing text leave a solitary law student to
stand, to learn, to think, to dream?141
Instruction in generalities about the specific (and mostly negative)
personality traits of successful lawyers, and instruction in a specific formulaic
method for writing each sentence and paragraph of the briefs and legal
memoranda, probably gives some students Elkins’ “desire to flee” to some other
arena, a place that includes a place for the soul, for the human voice, in legal
writing.
More recently, Andrea McCardle has echoed some of Elkins (and Stanchi’s)
concerns about alienation in legal writing and other skills education, “argu[ing]
that all entering law students (and most novice lawyers) are outsiders to
professional legal culture and its discourse. . . . [First-year law students]
frequently express their frustration and lack of confidence, and they worry that
they have lost touch with the sources of originality and creativity that once
animated their writing.”142 Perhaps McCardle’s most powerful insight is that,
as professional writers, lawyers always need to be conscious of
the words they choose, and that creative choice is possible, and
necessary, based on context, audience, and purpose. The
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Id. at 108 (footnotes and citations omitted).
McCardle, supra note 8, at 503-04.
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language of law should reflect the humanity and the serviceoriented goals of the legal profession . . . .143
Thus, McCardle questions whether perceived conflicts between the human voice
and the professional voice appropriate to legal writing need necessarily result in
muting the human voice. She challenges law teachers, law students, and lawyers,
to take head on the difficult task of “understanding and renaming [legal]
language” in our own words, thereby transforming ourselves “from being
outsiders to self-reflective insiders of this professional discourse community.”144
Many of McCardle’s suggestions for how to transform ourselves into “selfreflective insiders” would work well help engage first-year students in a more
sophisticated discussion of the law-trained audience. For example, legal writing
teachers might engage students in critical reading of judicial writing, considering
“matters of style or voice,” as well as “distinctive decision making approaches”
connected to those styles and voices.145 We might consider assigning students, as
McCardle suggests, “close, rhetorical reading of specimens of writing produced
for professional legal contexts,” such as Supreme Court briefs,146 or “reflective[]
or imaginative[] [writing] about legal subjects outside of a practice-based
context” as a “promising approach to cultivating individuality.”147
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Id. at 538.
Id. In a similar vein, see generally Kathryn Stanchi, Feminist Legal Writing, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 387 (2002).
145
Id. at 506-07 (discussing voice in judicial opinions, and Richard Posner’s typology of judicial
writing styles in Richard Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and Do They Matter)?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1421, 1429-32 (1995)).
146
McCardle, supra note 8, at 514-16.
147
Id. at 520. McCardle notes with approval the approaches of Mark Weisberg, who in his “Legal
Imagination” course “require[es] students to write a series of essays that address various social
experiences and exclusions implicating the legal system”; and Derrick Bell, who in Constitutional
Conflicts has required students to “write, among other things, ‘op-ed’ pieces about the
constitutional doctrine they are learning.” Id. at 521-22, note 74 (citing Mark Weisberg, Epilogue:
When (Law) Students Write, 27 Legal Stud. F. 421 (2003) and Derrick Bell, Constitutional
Conflicts: the Perils and Rewards of Pioneering in the Law School Classroom, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1039, 1047 (1998)). She also references James R. Elkins’ use of “a semester-long journalwriting option in a course exploring the role of the lawyer and professional legal culture.”
McCardle, supra note 8, at 522, note 83 (citing James R. Elkins, Writing Our Lives: Making
Introspective Writing a Part of Legal Education, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 45 (1993)).
144
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McCardle points out that, for instance, having novice legal writers read
Ruthann Robson’s Notes from a Difficult Case (in which Robson writes of her
battle with medical problems and the exacerbation of those problems by medical
malpractice, in legal, professional, and personal voices),148 “would be meaningful
. . . . [in that] Robson’s honesty in registering her frustration with the formal
terms of law and medicine, which are neither graceful, supple, nor humane, and
her willingness to translate those terms into language that is more resonant and
resilient.”149
Legal writing teachers might also take up Stanchi’s proposal, that more
critical legal scholarship should be introduced in the first year curriculum, and in
the legal writing classroom. The wealth of scholarship on the subject of narrative
in legal discourse offers food for thought, too.150
In fact, when not discussing the audience, many legal writing textbooks
already acknowledge the importance of recognizing multiple influences on a
given situation in the law. For instance, Edwards’ textbook discusses the
common student pitfall of “failing to realize the diverse possible interpretations
of the facts.”151 Edwards notes that “[m]any writers new to law fall into the trap
of assuming the infallibility of the inferences that someone else . . . has drawn
from the facts,” and failing to “think independently and realistically.”152 They
may also have trouble “imagining multiple interpretations simultaneously.”153
In a similar vein, legal writing teachers might consider David R. Papke’s suggestion that, if legal
education engaged law students in reading and analyzing appellate opinions as a sort genre
literature, one beneficial effect might be that “[l]aw school graduates might learn to tell better
stories on behalf of clients, draft fairer imagined worlds in legislatures, and shape more thoughtful
master narratives from the bench.” David Ray Papke, Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate
Opinions, 220 (in DAVID RAY PAPKE, ED., NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991)).
148
See Ruthann Robson, Notes from a Difficult Case, IN FACT: THE BEST OF CREATIVE NONFICTION
226 (Lee Gutkind, ed., 2005) (cited in McCardle, supra note 8, at 533, note 112).
149
McCardle, supra note 8, at 534. McCardle acknowledges that engaging students in such
sophisticated critical thought about the legal language they are still in the midst of learning may be
challenging, but argues that such work is just the thing that may “help[] to illuminate how legal
writers can bridge the space between a socialized professional voice, individuality, and
interpersonal client-attorney communication.” Id. at 534-36.
150
See, e.g., DAVID RAY PAPKE, ED., NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991), and 20 (1&2)
LEGAL STUD. F. 95 (1996).
151
EDWARDS, supra note 16, at 104.
152
Id.
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Edwards suggests that “each year of law practice will improve your ability to see
diverse interpretations of a set of facts.”154
Applying a similarly thoughtful, reflective approach to discussions of the
audience for legal writing would better help students grapple with the difficult
task of negotiating between their own voices and the audience for their writings.
Some legal writing teachers may resist the idea of adding assignments or
approaches to the first-year legal writing education, especially since, as Stanchi
points out, “[t]he goals, methodologies, and teaching framework of both the
process and social views of legal writing teach law students how to communicate
the language of the law effectively,”155 and some legal writing professors already
feel they “barely have the time and course hours to teach conventional legal
analysis, much less critical theory, positionality method or ‘meticulous
analysis.’”156 Or, one might add, narrative theory, reflective writing, and longer,
more complicated discussions about the law-trained reader.
Whether legal writing teachers approach the task consciously or not,
however, the fact is that legal writing courses inevitably are about more than
simply the technical matters, the vocabulary and manner of legal communication.
They are about “what lawyers are like.” We should stop offering half-truths and
generalizations about the “law-trained reader,” and instead acknowledge the
more difficult reality, “the ‘situated legal writer’ who must operate with a
recognition of institutional contexts and practices that make law a highly
complex professional discourse community.”157
Conclusion
In her book presenting her findings about students’ identity dissonance in
more detail, Costello ends with a section describing “Strategies for Reducing
Identity Dissonance,”158 arguing that “[t]he simplest and most important step is to
154
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Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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CARRIE YANG COSTELLO, PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SUCCESS
AT PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS 230 (2005).
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acknowledge that the problem of identity dissonance exists.”159 Legal writing
instructors have the opportunity to acknowledge the phenomenon of identity
dissonance when they engage students in thinking about the characteristics of the
law-trained reader. If instead legal writing teachers offer over-generalizations
about lawyers’ impatience, aggression, and formalism, without comment or
critique, we undermine our own credibility and teaching, and we send the
message that students should resolve perceived conflicts between their personal
and professional identity by abandoning personal identity in favor of the
generalizations we articulate. At the very least, legal writing education should
stop offering such overgeneralizations about what lawyers are like, and should
welcome more reflective, human discussions that might fill the vacuum left by
that silence.

159

Id. at 231.

